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 Abstract 
 
We first report that one-minute returns on TOPIX have exhibited significant 
autocorrelation at five-minute intervals since 1997/98, which implies there is an 
arbitrage opportunity.  Special quotes that are issued whenever there is a price jump in 
excess of a predetermined band seem to be the source of this autocorrelation, since these 
have been updated at five-minute intervals since August 1998.  Individual stock returns 
also exhibit fifth-order autocorrelation, but this disappears when the data with special 
quotes are excluded from the sample.  The arbitrage opportunities, however, turn out to 
be spurious since trading is suspended whenever a special quote is issued.  
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1. Introduction 
The efficient markets hypothesis asserts that stock prices follow a random walk and that 
there is no arbitrage opportunity to make a profit in such markets (Fama 1970).  There is a 
vast literature that has questioned the empirical validity of this hypothesis, but it appears we 
have no definitive answer to the questions (Fama 1991).  In this vein, we present evidence 
of autocorrelation of one-minute returns at five-minute intervals in Japanese stock prices and 
attempt to offer an explanation of this phenomenon. 
 The efficiency of financial markets is also examined with high-frequency data.  
The markets for foreign exchange and interest rate futures seem to react extremely rapidly to 
macroeconomic news announcements—within 40 seconds, according to Ederington and Lee 
(1995) and Almeida et al. (1998).  However, equity markets respond more slowly to 
earnings and dividend announcements, requiring ten to 15 minutes (Patell and Wolfson 
(1984)).  The response of the S&P 500 index to unexpected changes in the money supply 
and Consumer Price Index (CPI) is completed within one hour (Jain (1988)).  Tsutsui and 
Hirayama (2004) examine international linkage of New York and Tokyo stock prices and 
find the Tokyo market completes reactions to New York within six minutes, but New York 
reacts to Tokyo within 14 minutes. 
 Figure 1 plots Autocorrelation Functions (ACFs) of returns at one-minute intervals 
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in the TOPIX for the period from January 5, 1988 to November 23, 2003. 1  The first-order 
autocorrelation is significantly greater than zero and the fifth-order autocorrelation is 
similarly large.  The ACFs show spikes at five-minute intervals.  The 95% confidence 
band is also displayed in Figure 1: the ACFs become insignificant only after 40 minutes, 
exhibiting nontrivial serial correlation.2  
 The ACFs of the same minute-by-minute returns in the S&P 500 are plotted in 
Figure 2.  They exhibit a monotonically and rapidly decreasing pattern without spikes at 
five-minute intervals.  The ACFs become insignificant after ten minutes, implying that the 
New York Stock Exchange is more efficient than the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).   
 The fact that there is a significant fifth-order autocorrelation in the TOPIX 
minute-by-minute returns implies that there is some predictability in the return series.  
Namely, if there is a high one-minute return, it is likely to be followed by a high return five 
minutes hence.  This suggests that arbitrage opportunities exist.3  The purpose of this 
paper is to look into this possibility and to attempt to find the reason behind this five-minute 
serial correlation.   
                                                  
1 The TOPIX is a capitalization-weighted index of all the stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
2 This fact was first reported in 2002 by Mr. Hiroaki Kaido, then a senior student in the Faculty of 
Economics, Osaka University.  One of the authors sought other researchers in finance who had 
investigated this phenomenon, but was unable to find any.   
3 We focus on the fifth-order autocorrelation, but not on the first-order one, which is also 
significantly non-zero.  Since one minute is a very short interval, it would be more natural to have 
serial correlation at this frequency (see footnote 5 below).  However, serial correlation at a 
five-minute interval seems to constitute a systematic anomaly worth investigating.  In addition, 
after 2002 the first-order autocorrelation becomes considerably weaker, while the fifth-order one gets 
stronger, such that the latter is now three times larger than the former.    
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2.  Features of Fifth-order Autocorrelation 
We will present evidence for fifth-order autocorrelation in one-minute TOPIX returns and 
delineate possible causes in this section.  Let us first examine whether this phenomenon is 
present throughout the entire sample period or whether it emerged at a certain point.  The 
entire sample from January 5, 1988 to November 23, 2003 was split into two subperiods 
with the break point varied at several dates.  Experiments revealed that data before 1997 
exhibited no autocorrelation at five-minute intervals.  To be more specific on the timing of 
the emergence of this phenomenon, we carried out two sets of computations: i) we selected 
data for each one-month or three-month period and computed first- and fifth-order 
autocorrelations, ii) while fixing the start of the sample at January 4, 1994 we successively 
deferred the end of the sample from January 31, 1995 by one month and computed the same 
autocorrelations.4  Excessive noise in the results for one month and three months made 
unambiguous conclusions for these periods impossible.  Results for the second set are 
given in Figure 3, which plots the fifth-order autocorrelation denoted as ACF(5) and the 
ratio of the fifth- to first-order autocorrelation, ACF(5)/ACF(1). ACF(5) shows a slight 
declining tendency between January 1995 and October 1997, but it exhibits a steep increase 
                                                  
4 We chose this start date because if January 5, 1988, were selected instead, the number of 
observations with fifth-order autocorrelation would be overwhelmed by those without it, obscuring 
the distinction between the two.   
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between October and December 1997.  It becomes stable again, but increases further 
between September and November 1998. After 1999 through the end of the sample period it 
increases steadily, albeit slowly.   
 The ratio ACF(5)/ACF(1), measured along the right scale, is almost constant until 
August 1997 and increases through January 1998.  It then stabilizes, but shows a clear 
increase between August and November 1998.  Subsequently it gradually grows in value. 
After the year 2000 ACF(5)/ACF(1) rises more quickly than ACF(5), which indicates that 
ACF(1) is declining.  The first-order ACF does exhibit a rapid decrease in the last three 
years of the sample and this may indicate rising efficiency of the TSE.5   
 We next examined whether the serial correlation at five-minute intervals is 
observed during particular hours of the day.  The Tokyo Stock Exchange is open for trading 
between 9:00 and 15:00, with a lunch break.  Until April 26, 1991, there was a two-hour 
lunch break between 11:00 and 13:00, which became a 90-minute lunch break between 
11:00 and 12:30 after April 30, 1991.  After some trial and error we found that the serial 
correlation disappears when the data between 9:01 and 09:30 are excluded (Figure 4).  This 
strongly suggests that the serial correlation is caused by some characteristics arising during 
the first half hour of daily trading in the TSE.   
 Statistical measures of one-minute returns, denoted by Rhhmm, are presented in 
                                                  
5  Serial correlation may not contradict the random walk hypothesis.  However, when 
minute-by-minute data is used, absence of trading (which is likely at such a high frequency) leads to 
stale prices and therefore serial correlation.  
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Table 1.  These measures are computed across days.  Specifically, rather than considering 
one-minute returns as one long series, each one-minute return is considered as a separate 
variable and is treated as a daily sample.  Note that R0901 is the daily overnight return 
from the previous day’s close to the opening of the day.  Means are most notably positive 
and large for R0901 and R0906.  Maximum and minimum values are also very large for 
these two variables compared with other adjacent returns.  The fifth-order Ljung-Box Q 
statistic is also computed.  Note, again, that each variable is observed at a daily frequency, 
thus the null hypothesis of this portmanteau test is that all the first- through fifth-order 
autocorrelation coefficients at daily frequency are zero.  This statistic exhibits a very high 
(daily) serial correlation for R0901 and R0906.  These characteristics more or less apply to 
R0911 and R0916, which also implies the existence of some seasonality at five-minute 
intervals.6   
 These results may imply that there is an underlying cause of the correlation 
occurring between returns at five-minute intervals at 9:01, 9:06, 9:11, and 9:16.  Figure 5 
plots the ACFs of one-minute returns excluding observations at these four minutes.  As 
expected, the fifth-order autocorrelation disappears almost completely.  Thus, this 
autocorrelation seems to be caused by data at those four particular minutes, i.e. at 9:01, 9:06, 
9:11, and 9:16.  If the overnight return observed at 9:01 (R0901) is positive (negative), then 
                                                  
6 A similar regularity at five-minute intervals is reported in Tsutsui and Hirayama (2004) who 
estimated the reaction of the TOPIX one-minute returns to the previous day’s daily return in New 
York.   
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we would expect to see a rise (fall) in the one-minute return at 9:06.  A natural question we 
are tempted to ask is ‘Can we make money by exploiting this autocorrelation?’  We devised 
a hypothetical investment strategy in which one buys (sells short) TOPIX when the 
overnight return is positive (negative) and one sells (buys) TOPIX at 9:06.  We computed 
five-minute returns between 9:01 and 9:06 based on this strategy in Table 2 with the data 
restricted to the year 2003.  The row labeled ‘Long Position’ is the result of taking a long 
position in TOPIX between 9:01 and 9:06.  Out of 245 days in 2003, there were 148 days 
when the overnight return was positive.  The mean return for this long position is 0.166%.  
‘Short Position’ is the result of taking a short position following a negative overnight return 
at 9:01.  The mean is 0.180%.  Both have a t-statistic in excess of 7.0, which is highly 
significant.  If the two results are merged, the mean return for the year is 0.171%.  Since 
you can expect to earn this return every day during the 245-day period, its annualized return 
is almost 42% (0.171 x 245 = 41.895).  Tsutsui (2003) reports a tendency of Japanese stock 
prices to rise during the night, but the average overnight return during 2003 is 0.148% 
according to Table 2, which is smaller than the mean five-minute return we have just 
analyzed.   
 There are two possible causes of this correlation.7  Firstly, the Volume Weighted 
Average Price (VWAP) transactions are a candidate for the cause of this anomaly, since they 
                                                  
7 This was communicated to us in private correspondence from Mr. Masato Hirota, then at the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange.   
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were introduced in November 1997 and securities companies that undertake them are said to 
place most of their buy and sell orders at five-minute intervals to minimize impacts on the 
market price.  Another candidate is special quotes, which are announced whenever the next 
equilibrium price exceeds a predetermined band.  The quotes are set at the ceiling or the 
floor of this band and execution of orders is suspended temporarily.  The announcement is 
designed to alert market participants to a substantial change in price and to encourage them 
to place orders to exploit the new information.  When a special quote fails to induce the 
price to stay within the band, the band is doubled and after five minutes a new special quote 
is announced.  Thus, the purpose of these quotes is to smooth out the price path.  The TSE 
instituted an automated system of updating these special quotes at five-minute intervals in 
August 1998, which is likely to produce autocorrelation at this frequency.  In addition, the 
overwhelming majority of special quotes are announced at the opening, which will be 
discussed in detail below.   
 We observed a gradual increase in fifth-order autocorrelation in late 1997 and the 
fall of 1998 in Figure 3, which is consistent with both the introduction of VWAP 
transactions in November 1997 and the start of automated announcement of special quotes 
in August 1998.  However, VWAP transactions are conducted throughout the day, which 
therefore fails to explain the fact that the five-minute periodicity appears only during the 
9:01–9:30 period.  Therefore, in the next section we will utilize data on individual stock 
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prices to explore whether special quotes are the cause of autocorrelation at five-minute 
intervals.   
 
3. Are Special Quotes the Cause of Fifth-order Autocorrelation? 
We focus on individual stock prices in this section and examine whether special quotes 
cause the fifth-order autocorrelation.  We ruled out VWAP transactions as the cause of the 
observed autocorrelation, because these transactions are conducted throughout the day 
whereas the autocorrelation appears only between 9:01 and 9:30.  The same observation 
may hold true for special quotes, which are also announced throughout the day whenever the 
required condition is satisfied.  We thus attempt to show that the bulk of special quotes are 
observed during the first half hour of daily trading and that they are the likely cause of the 
autocorrelation.  We utilize tick-by-tick data obtained from the MAINS (Market 
Information System) of the TSE.  200 stocks were selected out of around 1,500 listed in the 
first section of the TSE.  The criterion was that the average daily trading volume exceeds 
500 times the trading unit of the stock.8  The sample period is from April 2003 to 
December 2003.   
 Let us first examine when special quotes are observed most frequently during the 
                                                  
8 The trading unit is the minimum number of shares to be bought and sold.  The majority of stocks 
traded in TSE have a trading unit of 1,000 shares, but some have different trading units.  The reason 
for selecting those stocks with a daily volume over 500 times the trading unit is to analyze those with 
sufficient liquidity.  
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day.  Table 3 lists the number of occurrences of special quotes classified by their timing: i) 
opening of the morning session, ii) Zaraba trading (continuous auction) during the morning 
session, iii) opening of the afternoon session, and iv) Zaraba trading during the afternoon 
session.9  The second column gives the number of occurrences of special quotes for all the 
stocks and the third column shows their proportions of the total.  Over three quarters of 
special quotes (77.1%) occur at the opening of the morning session.  The opening of the 
afternoon session also exhibits many instances of special quotes, but the proportion to the 
total is 12.8%.  The reason for the substantial share at the opening of the morning session is 
probably that new information gathered overnight gives rise to discontinuous price jumps.   
 We next examine whether the frequency of special quotes is related to the liquidity 
of the stock.  We would expect to see more special quotes for stocks with low liquidity.  
For this purpose we classified 200 stocks according to the size of market capitalization.10  
The largest 40 stocks are called Group 5, the next largest 40 Group 4, and so forth.  
Occurrences of special quotes for each of these groups are displayed in Table 3.  Group 5 
has 1877 occurrences of special quotes, which is somewhat fewer than for the other groups.  
                                                  
9 The TSE is open for trading from 9:00 to 11:00 for the morning session and from 12:30 to 15:00 for 
the afternoon session.  Orders are accepted from 8:00 for the morning session and from 12:05 for 
the afternoon session.  The opening prices of these sessions are determined by the itayose method 
in which all orders are treated as arriving simultaneously and as many shares as possible are traded at 
a single equilibrium price.  After the opening, trading is done by the zaraba method which is a 
continuous auction.  However, whenever trading is halted, say, due to the announcement of a 
special quote, the subsequent price is determined by the itayose method.  Amihud and Mendelson 
(1991) analyze the itayose system and argue that this difference in the two price formation processes, 
itayose and zaraba, may produce differences in prices and trading volumes. 
10 Market capitalization is regarded as a proxy for liquidity of the stock.   
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However, as the size of the stock decreases, we observe no tendency for the occurrences to 
increase.  Thus, there seems to be no clear correlation between the frequency of special 
quotes and the liquidity of each stock.  However, the timing of special quotes is 
overwhelmingly concentrated at the opening of the morning session.  There were 8,922 
cases of special quotes for 200 stocks during the nine-month period (about 180 business 
days).  For each stock there were an average of about 45 occurrences (8,922÷200), which 
translates approximately into one occurrence for every four days (180 45).   ÷
 Our focus is then on when these special quotes are dissolved.  Special quotes are 
invoked whenever a large price change is required to clear the market.  Suppose, for 
example, that favorable information about a certain company results in a market order for 
50,000 shares to be purchased and another market order for 1,000 shares to be sold.  If the 
closing price of the previous day is 1,200 yen, the regulation of the TSE dictates that a 
special quote of 1,220 yen be announced to inform market participants of the existence of a 
large buy order.  If someone entered a sell order of 49,000 shares, the market clears at 
1,220 yen.  However, if there is no sell order, the special quote is updated after five minutes 
to 1,240 yen in order to entice a sell order at this higher price.  This updating of a special 
quote continues until it reaches the daily price limit.  Expecting a higher price, potential 
sellers seem to wait for the next special quote to be announced.  Thus, new sell orders are 
likely to be placed at five-minute intervals at which subsequent special quotes are 
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announced.  Table 4 gives the cumulative distribution of the time at which a special quote 
is dissolved.  As expected, dissolution occurs at 9:01, 9:06, 9:11, 9:16, etc., at five-minute 
intervals.  In particular there are 3,773 dissolutions at 9:06, which is about 42% of the 
special quotes announced at the opening of the morning session.   
 In order to assert that special quotes are the cause of fifth-order autocorrelation in 
minute-by-minute stock returns, we need to have two special quotes occurring consecutively.  
These prices have then to rise or decline by a substantial margin in the same direction, 
resulting in positive autocorrelation in stock returns.  This is limited by the number of 
special quotes that are dissolved immediately following the opening of the morning and 
afternoon sessions when most of the special quotes are observed.  If a substantial 
proportion of them are dissolved within five minutes of opening, observed fifth-order 
autocorrelation is not explained by special quotes.  Table 5 indicates the cumulative 
number of dissolutions following opening of the morning or afternoon sessions.  After the 
market opens in the morning, only 33% of the special quotes at the opening are dissolved 
within five minutes.  In other words, 67% of the special quotes at the opening are updated 
and reannounced as special quotes after five minutes, vindicating the assertion above.  
However, about 80% of special quotes that occur at the opening of afternoon sessions are 
dissolved within five minutes according to Table 5.  This is quite consistent with the fact 
that the fifth-order autocorrelation seems to be caused only by data between 9:01 and 9:30 
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(Figure 4).  In summary, the above analyses indicate that fifth-order autocorrelation is 
caused by the existence of a substantial number of special quotes that persist for over five 
minutes after the opening of the morning session.   
 We now attempt to provide direct evidence of special quotes in individual stock 
prices giving rise to autocorrelation.  We first verify that autocorrelation is also present 
with individual prices.  We then exclude special quotes immediately following the opening 
from the individual stock prices by checking all entries in the tick-by-tick data.  If this 
leads to the disappearance of fifth-order autocorrelation, we shall have additional evidence 
linking special quotes with autocorrelation.   
 We selected five individual stocks from different sectors, for which special quotes 
occur most frequently: UFJ Bank, Softbank, Oracle Japan, Oki Electric, and Acom.  Due to 
limited space, we only present results for Oracle Japan, but results for the other companies 
are basically the same.  During our nine-month sample period (approximately 180 days), 
the stock of Oracle Japan experienced 78 special quotes at the opening of the morning 
session, which is close to one special quote every two days.  Computation of 
minute-by-minute returns requires us to select a single price value for each minute.  When 
we have a special quote, it is the price we use.  However, during the ordinary zaraba 
trading, we chose the mid value of bid and ask prices because the actual transaction price 
exhibits a significant negative autocorrelation due to bid-ask bounces.  Adoption of 
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mid-range values substantially mitigates the apparent volatility caused by bid-ask bounces.   
 The ACFs of one-minute returns of Oracle Japan exhibit spikes at five-minute 
intervals (Figure 6) just like TOPIX returns.  When we exclude returns involved with 
special quotes, the ACFs of Oracle Japan stock returns show no spikes at all (Figure 7).  
Exactly the same difference is reproduced with the other four individual stock returns.  
Therefore, analyses with individual stock prices also verify our hypothesis that fifth-order 
autocorrelation in stock returns is caused by special quotes.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper we first reported that one-minute returns in Japanese stock price index 
(TOPIX) exhibit significant autocorrelation at five-minute intervals.  We then found that 
this autocorrelation seems to have been caused by returns at 9:01, 9:06, 9:11, 9:16, etc. since 
around 1997.  There are two possible causes for this phenomenon: VWAP transactions and 
special quotes.  The former candidate is easily ruled out because the observed fifth-order 
autocorrelation is mainly caused by data between 9:01 and 9:30, whereas VWAP 
transactions are executed throughout the day.  However, almost 80% of special quotes are 
announced at the opening of the morning session of the TSE and two thirds of them are 
renewed as special quotes after five minutes.  New special quotes are announced at 
five-minute intervals at higher or lower prices than the previous special quote, thus giving 
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rise to a positive autocorrelation at five-minute intervals.  We also analyzed individual 
stock prices.  They also exhibit a fifth-order autocorrelation in one-minute stock returns, 
but this disappears when the data with special quotes are excluded from the sample.  Thus 
special quotes, which started to be automatically updated at five-minute intervals starting in 
August 1998, seem to be the definitive cause of the fifth-order autocorrelation in one-minute 
Japanese stock returns. 
 The implication of this finding is serious.  Existence of autocorrelation contradicts 
the popular Random Walk Hypothesis of stock prices.  It can be construed as evidence 
against the efficiency of a stock market.  However, this does not necessarily present 
feasible arbitrage opportunities.  It should be noted that whenever a special quote is 
announced, trading is halted, thus preventing the arbitrageur from executing his/her order.  
Consecutive special quotes at five-minute intervals indicate that the pause in trading is 
prolonged.  Therefore, the arbitrage opportunities we found turn out to be spurious.11   
                                                  
11 If the arbitrage between the spot and futures prices of TOPIX is active, autocorrelation in spot 
prices may be transmitted to futures prices.  We examined the data for TOPIX futures, but their 
minute-by-minute returns exhibit no autocorrelation. However, this should be the case because one 
cannot make an arbitrage with special quotes in the spot market.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of One-Minute Returns in TOPIX 
 
?  Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Q(5) Signif. 
R0901 0.0237  1.2910 –1.3846 0.3037 39.0008  0.0000  
R0902 0.0099  0.5316 –0.4680 0.1221 22.4958  –0.0004 
R0903 0.0029  0.3138 –0.3706 0.0667 8.7334  –0.1202 
R0904 0.0021  0.3359 –0.3077 0.0537 6.4776  –0.2625 
R0905 –0.0002  0.3043 –0.2597 0.0494 16.0823  –0.0066 
R0906 0.0053  0.8742 –0.8379 0.1305 20.3686  –0.0011 
R0907 –0.0002  0.3728 –0.4153 0.0546 13.8090  –0.0169 
R0908 –0.0004  0.2938 –0.2944 0.0488 7.2123  –0.2053 
R0909 –0.0022  0.2871 –0.3363 0.0463 12.9162  –0.0242 
R0910 –0.0017  0.2574 –0.2314 0.0427 11.8728  –0.0366 
R0911 –0.0008  0.6286 –0.6789 0.0710 40.5825  0.0000  
R0912 –0.0016  0.3382 –0.3036 0.0434 8.5337  –0.1292 
R0913 –0.0024  0.2259 –0.2589 0.0419 4.8515  –0.4343 
R0914 –0.0016  0.2651 –0.3010 0.0411 5.0042  –0.4154 
R0915 –0.0004  0.3317 –0.2638 0.0404 8.7014  –0.1216 
R0916 –0.0010  0.4101 –0.4157 0.0497 20.9279  –0.0008 
R0917 –0.0024  0.2943 –0.2274 0.0406 3.1367  –0.6789 
R0918 –0.0019  0.2364 –0.2524 0.0380 4.9443  –0.4227 
R0919 –0.0014  0.2408 –0.2661 0.0389 7.1877  –0.2070 
R0920 –0.0017  0.2358 –0.2320 0.0374 10.7319  –0.0570 
R0921 –0.0009  0.3059 –0.2989 0.0429 5.2743  –0.3833 
 
Notes:  Rhhmm refers to one-minute TOPIX returns for each day in the sample period: January 5, 
1988 to November 28, 2003.  Q(5) is the Ljung-Box statistic testing the null hypothesis that all the 
first- to fifth-order autocorrelation coefficients are zero.   
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Table 2.  Five-minute Returns between 9:01 and 9:06 on Positions 
According to the Overnight Return 
 
 Mean 
S.E. of 
Mean 
t-stat p-value 
Num. of  
Obs. 
Long Position 0.166 0.022 7.591 0.000 148 
Short Position 0.180 0.025 7.072 0.000 97 
Total 0.171 0.017 10.342 0.000 245 
Reference: R0901 0.148 0.036 4.137 0.000 245 
 
Notes: ‘Long Position’ is the five-minute return on taking a long position on the TOPIX between 
9:01 and 9:06 when the overnight return (R0901) is positive.  ‘Short Position’ is the five-minute 
return on a short position on the TOPIX between 9:01 and 9:06 when the overnight return is negative. 
‘Total’ is the sum of these two returns. S.E. is the standard error. t-stat tests a null hypothesis that the 
mean is zero. The same statistics are computed for the overnight return, R0901, for reference.   
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Table 3.  Frequency of Special Quotes Classified by the Timing 
of their Announcements 
 
 All Stocks Proportion Group 5 Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1
Opening, Morning 
Session 
8922 77.1 1749 1970 2086 1593 1524 
Zaraba Trading, 
Morning Session 
804 6.9 20 57 158 258 311 
Opening, Afternoon 
Session 
1481 12.8 101 240 321 318 501 
Zaraba Trading, 
Afternoon Session 
370 3.2 7 26 62 105 170 
Total 11577 100 1877 2293 2627 2274 2506 
 
Notes: Frequencies of special quotes for 200 stocks selected from the first section of the TSE are 
tabulated according to the timing of their announcements.  Tick-by-tick data from April 2003 to 
December 2003 were utilized to count the frequency.  Group 5 is comprised of the 40 stocks with 
the largest market capitalization; Group 4 is the next largest 40, etc.   
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Table 4.  Number of Dissolutions of Special Quotes Following 
the Opening of the Morning Session 
Time of 
Dissolution 
All 
Stocks 
Group 5 Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
9:01 1077 212 260 251 169 185 
9:02 628 101 151 164 112 100 
9:03 496 99 109 100 97 91 
9:04 401 77 74 106 72 72 
9:05 360 88 67 90 69 46 
9:06 3773 751 832 860 713 617 
9:07 251 50 52 56 46 47 
9:08 171 39 32 47 29 24 
9:09 147 23 35 39 20 30 
9:10 118 20 27 34 16 21 
9:11 815 176 164 195 148 132 
9:12 78 20 9 17 12 20 
9:13 52 10 14 9 7 12 
9:14 44 7 8 6 10 13 
9:15 38 8 10 11 3 6 
9:16 226 35 60 53 40 38 
9:17 20 5 7 2 1 5 
9:18 30 3 8 6 4 9 
9:19 17 5 3 0 4 5 
9:20 16 1 3 5 1 6 
9:21 55 7 13 17 10 8 
9:22 16 1 5 5 2 3 
9:23 5 1 4 0 0 0 
9:24 9 2 2 1 0 4 
9:25 2 0 0 0 1 1 
9:26 23 3 4 7 1 8 
9:27 4 0 1 1 0 2 
9:28 5 0 1 1 0 3 
9:29 3 0 3 0 0 0 
9:30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9:31 8 1 3 0 0 4 
Notes: The number of special quotes that were dissolved by the indicated time is given in each row.  
Tick-by-tick data for 200 stocks from April 2003 to November 2003 were utilized.  Group 5 is 
comprised of the 40 stocks with the largest market capitalization, Group 4 is the next largest 40, etc. 
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Table 5.  Frequency of Cumulated Dissolutions of Special Quotes 
Following the Opening of the Morning and Afternoon Session 
 
Morning Session Afternoon Session Time 
Elapsed 
(min.) 
Cum. Num. of 
Dissolutions 
Proportion to 
Total 
Cum. Num. of 
Dissolutions 
Proportion of 
Total 
1 1,077 12% 796 54% 
2 1,705 19% 999 67% 
3 2,201 25% 1,081 73% 
4 2,602 29% 1,135 77% 
5 2,962 33% 1,186 80% 
6 6,735 75% 1,336 90% 
 
Notes: The cumulative number of dissolutions of special quotes is given for the first six minutes after 
the opening of the morning and afternoon sessions.  Those for the morning session are the 
cumulative sums of the first six entries of the second column of Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 1.  ACF of TOPIX One-Minute Returns
(01/05/1988 - 11/28/2003)
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Note: The autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of one-minute returns in TOPIX are plotted.  
  
Figure 2. ACF of S&P500 One-Minute Returns
(01/05/1988 - 11/28/2003)
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Note:  The ACFs of one-minute S&P 500 returns are plotted.  
  
Figure 3.  Fifth-order ACF and Its Ratio to First-order ACF
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Note:  Fifth-order ACF and its ratio to first-order ACF in TOPIX one-minute returns are plotted.   
  
Figure 4.  ACFs of TOPIX One-Minute Returns
(Data between 9:01 and 9:30 excluded.)
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
1 6
1
1
1
6
2
1
2
6
3
1
3
6
4
1
4
6
5
1
5
6
Upper Bound
ACF
Lower Bound
 
Notes:  One-minute returns between 9:01 and 9:30 are excluded from the sample.   
  
Figure 5.  ACFs of TOPIX One-Minute Returns
( 09:01, 09:06, 09:11, and 09:16 Obs. are excluded.)
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Notes:  Four data points at 9:01, 9:06, 9:11, and 9:16 each day are excluded from the sample.   
  
Figure 6.  ACFs of One-Minute Return of Oracle Japan
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Notes: ACFs of one-minute returns in Oracle Japan shares are plotted.  The sample period is from April 2003 to November 2003. 
 
  
Figure 7.  ACFs of One-Minute Return of Oracle Japan
(Special quotes are excluded.)
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Notes: ACFs of one-minute returns of Oracle Japan are plotted, but the data involved with special quotes immediately following the opening of the 
morning session are excluded.  The sample period is from April 2003 to November 2003. 
  
